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Greetings! This letter comes to you from your Pakistani nephew whom you do
not know, nor does anyone else in your land of seven freedoms.
You should know why my country, sliced away from India, came into being and
gained independence, which is why I am taking the liberty of writing to you. Like
my country, I too have become independent and in exactly the same way. Uncle,
I will not labour the point since an all-knowing seer like you can well imagine the
freedom a bird whose wings have been clipped can enjoy. . . .
My country is poor. It has no art paper, nor proper printing presses. I am living
evidence of this poverty. You will not believe it, uncle, but despite being the author of
twenty-two books, I do not havemy own house to live in. And youwill be astonished
to know that I have no means of getting myself from one place to the other. I neither
have a Packard nor aDodge; I do not even have a used car. . . .Youwill certainly ask
me out of astonishment whymy country is poor when it boasts of somany Packards,
Buicks and Max Factor cosmetics. That is indeed so, uncle, but I will not answer
your question because, if you look into your heart, you will find the answer there
(unless you have had your heart taken out by one of your brilliant surgeons).
That section of my country’s population which rides in Packards and Buicks is
really not of my country. Where poor people like me and those even poorer live,
that is my country.1
* Email: vh1@soas.ac.uk. The author is immensely grateful to the entire ColdWar International
Law dream team for creating andmaintaining an outstanding space for exchange, learning and
mutual appreciation throughout the long transnational journey that has led to this publication.
The present chapter owes much to that unique space and, especially, to the abiding intellectual
generosity of Professor Sundhya Pahuja and Dr Safet HadžiMuhamedović. Thank you all!
1 Saadat Hasan Manto, ‘First Letter to Uncle Sam’ in Letters to Uncle Sam Hasan Khalid
trans. (Alhamra Printing, 2001) 15–16. For the letter in its original language, see Saadat
Hasan Manto, Manto Rama (Sang-e-Meel, 1990) 356–7.
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Thus wrote, at ‘his perspicacious best’,2 the unparalleled Urdu short story
writer and enfant terrible, Saadat Hasan Manto, in the first in a series of
his fictitious letters to Uncle Sam in December 1951. Sardonic and
plaintive about Pakistan’s post-partition fate – epitomised by the new
country’s elites riding in their flashy American cars toward an ever-closer
political, military and economic alliance with Uncle Sam –Manto’s letter
perfectly captures the Zeitgeist of rancour that Pakistan’s left-leaning
intelligentsia felt and expressed at the state of the country’s class-cum-
political affairs in the early years of the global Cold War. Depressed and
broke, facing an ‘obscenity’ charge, Manto wrote the letter several days
before ‘being readmitted to the anti-alcoholic ward of the mental
hospital’.3 Having, as the letter bitterly portends, become ‘independent’
and in exactly the sameway as his country, the writer saw his own poverty
and hopelessness as a true reflection of the direction his society had taken
in the years immediately following the carnage of 1947 partition of the
British Raj into the sovereign states of India and Pakistan.
The year in which Manto wrote the letter was not an ordinary one.
Several months earlier, in February and March 1951, Pakistan’s govern-
ment charged several of its high-ranking military officials, as well as two
members of the central committee of the Communist Party of Pakistan,
Mohammad Ata and Sajjad Zaheer, of sedition and of planning a Soviet-
backed coup d’état. Despite flimsy evidence against the alleged plotters,
this case, popularly named the Rawalpindi Conspiracy,4 impelled the
state to unleash a wide-ranging clampdown on Pakistan’s prominent
leftists, including the luminary Faiz Ahmed Faiz, often described as
‘one of Pakistan’s greatest poets’.5 Later the same year, Pakistan’s first
Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, was assassinated in an unrelated
attack.
These events plunged Pakistan into a deep political turmoil and greatly
influenced its future class relations and ideological orientation, which, in
turn, reflected its never-quite-smooth sailing on the high seas of the
global ColdWar. On the one hand, the near-evisceration of the country’s
2 Ayesha Jalal, The Pity of Partition: Manto’s Life, Times, and Work across the India–
Pakistan Divide (Princeton University Press, 2011) 189–90.
3 Ibid., 190.
4 For an excellent analysis of the Rawalpindi Conspiracy, see Kamran Asdar Ali,
Communism in Pakistan: Politics and Class Activism 1947–1972 (I. B. Tauris, 2015)
114–43.
5 See, e.g., ‘Remembering Faiz’ (Staff Report), Dawn (3 February 2012) http://forum
.dawn.com/2011/02/13/the-current-debate-remembering-faiz/.
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Left made it a weak spot for the elaborate British and American intelli-
gence networks operating within and without its territorial borders.6 The
security void caused by the Prime Minister’s assassination, on the other
hand, marked the beginning of Pakistan’s long evolution toward an artful
messianic state, later dubbed the ‘Muslim Zion’ for its pretence of making
the observance of Islam a national and nation-making affair par
excellence.7
Taking the 1951 annus horribilis as a point of rupture, this chapter
seeks to illuminate the political and legal developments bringing the
once-neutral and non-aligned Pakistan firmly into Uncle Sam’s Cold
War embrace. Against a great deal of contemporary Cold War scholar-
ship, I argue that Pakistan’s complex relations with the United States – as
well as with the Soviet Union, China, India and Afghanistan (each briefly
examined in the present text) – place it firmly at the centre of global Cold
War politics. That this was not immediately apparent to many a Cold
War analyst should come as no surprise; rather, it attests to the deceptive
nature of Cold War international relations, shrouded in secrecy, back-
room dealing and ideologically ambiguous manoeuvres. In these affairs,
ThirdWorld countries such as Pakistan often played a decisive role – but
that role had to remain hidden for a variety of reasons, including that of
the essential Cold War mythopoeia based on ‘the balance of powers’
between the Western and Eastern blocs. What’s more, as a curious site of
many a ‘cold’ and ‘warm’ regional war since its very inception, including
those occurring well after the supposed end of the global Cold War,
Pakistan’s story to date is one of seemingly infinite warfare and political
instability. I contend that this story is a reflection of the state’s continuous
internal political (and, particularly, class) struggle as well as its early less-
than-successful attempts to excel in Cold War international lawfare8 in
6 The British Foreign Office collections on Pakistan and India, 1947–64, represent a rich
archival source for studying secret diplomatic correspondence relative, in particular, to the
British preoccupationwith closelymonitoring Pakistan’s political Left and labourmovements.
In the early days of the ColdWar, the gathered intelligence was regularly shared with the CIA
and the US State Department. For an introductory text, see William Gould, ‘The Changing
Dynamics of Indian and Pakistani Society: State, Politics and Commonwealth’ (Archives
Direct, 2011) www.archivesdirect.amdigital.co.uk/Essays/Gould#_ftn55.
7 See generally Faisal Devji, Muslim Zion: Pakistan as a Political Idea (Hurst & Co, 2013).
See also Vanja Hamzić, ‘Review of Faisal Devji,Muslim Zion: Pakistan as a Political Idea’
(2016) 36 South Asia Research 288; Jakob Rösel, ‘Pakistan: Kunststaat, Militärstaat und
Krisenstaat’ (2009) 40 Internationales Asienforum 255.
8 While the term ‘lawfare’warrants caution, given its recent surge in right-wing scholarship,
I find its basic definition, denoting the use of law as a weapon of war, salient and worth
‘reclaiming’, particularly for studies of Cold War international law.
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which its neighbouring states and the two global superpowers have
arguably been more successful.
To illustrate this point, this chapter revisits some Cold War ‘ques-
tions’, or sites of regional political and legal importance, such as those
of Kashmir, Jammu and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (‘Pashtunistan’), as
well as the quintessential Third World spaces of (anti-)Cold War
legal and political struggle, such as the international conferences in
Bandung (1955) and Havana (1966). I argue that the (often idiosyn-
cratic) interventions of Pakistan’s diplomats and international lawyers
in these sites form a distinct legal and political trajectory, which is at
odds with the arbitrary, yet ubiquitous, conceptual delineations
between ‘cold’ and ‘warm’ wars. Far from being peripheral to global
Cold War developments, Pakistan’s internal and international rela-
tions and troubles provide a rich source of strategies and ideas about
the state, law and society in the Third World. They are, however, also
a testament to the centrality of class struggle in a post-colony –
a struggle, exemplified in the events of 1951, that no lawfare could
bring to an end.
II Pakistan’s Search for a Place in Early Cold
War Geographies
Fraught as it is with its many definitional contests,9 the bulk of Cold War
scholarship emanating from the formerWestern bloc has failed to engage
substantially with the world regions it deemed only tangentially impor-
tant to global geopolitical wrangles that had shaped and shaken the Cold
War strata. We are often told, for example, that South Asia figured very
little in early ColdWar imaginaries, except perhaps as a distant ‘Oriental’
terra incognita. Thus, the remark of a New York congressman, on the eve
of the partition of the British Raj, suggesting that ‘most Americans still
think of India as a land of minarets and performers of the rope-trick’,
seems to an influential ColdWar historian ‘hardly exaggerated’.10 In such
narratives, Pakistan is routinely regarded as a case study for Cold War
suzerainties in the Third World, for its unlikely ability to ‘charm’ (to its
own detriment) a global superpower and, in a relatively short period of
9 See, e.g., Odd Arne Westad, ‘The Cold War and the International History of the
Twentieth Century’ in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds.), The Cambridge
History of the Cold War: Volume 1 – Origins (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 1.
10 Robert J. McMahon, ‘US Policy toward South Asia and Tibet during the Early Cold War’
(2006) 8(3) Journal of Cold War Studies 131, 132.
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time, become ‘America’s most allied ally in Asia’.11 However, a closer
look to the early days of both the ColdWar and Pakistan’s existence as an
independent state reveals a much more complex and intriguing picture.
Despite their ability to appeal to ‘landowners, businessmen, lawyers,
socialists, intellectuals and the middle classes’12 in the call for the creation
of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali Jinnah and the Muslim League ‘made
governing the new state a matter of political gamesmanship where the
party officials continued to manipulate colonial laws and legal proce-
dures to stay in power’.13 Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan made cen-
tralising the state bureaucracy his main task, especially after Jinnah’s
death in 1948. Pakistan’s early instability, caused by a range of crises
often involving its immediate neighbour states, made a seemingly com-
pelling case for a centrist government:
There is no denying that the new state had enormous economic and social
challenges, foremost being the settling of refugees who had poured into
the country, mostly destitute and without resources. There were secessio-
nist tendencies in NWFP [North-West Frontier Province, or Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa as it has been known since 2010] politics that were being
encouraged by the Afghan government and the lingering problem of
Kashmir was ever present, making the security of the country vulnerable.
The government, taking advantage of these issues, continuously relied on
the Public Safety Act and other new draconian measures to keep a check
on political opponents.14
In those difficult circumstances, the British and US intelligence agencies
took it upon themselves to ensure that Liaquat Ali Khan’s Government
remained hostile toward communism. As a result, at least two secret state
committees were formed in 1949 ‘to combat communism in government
services’.15 Early domestic studies, however, suggest that Pakistani political
elites, while wary of the internal ‘communist threat’, had no intention at
first to align themselves with either of the two superpowers.16 In 1949,
11 Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography (Oxford
University Press, 1967) 130. It is unlikely that General Ayub Khan, Pakistan’s second
President (1958–69) and the author of this unfortunate phrase, could anticipate it
becoming the symbol of his state’s overwhelming dependence on the United States.
12 Allen McGrath, The Destruction of Pakistan’s Democracy (Oxford University Press,
1996) 52–3.
13 Ali, Communism in Pakistan, above n. 4, 121.
14 Ibid., 122.
15 Ibid., 123.
16 Hafeez-ur-Rahman Khan, ‘Pakistan’s Relations with the USSR’ (1961) 14 Pakistan
Horizon 40; Mohammed Ahsen Chaudhri, ‘Pakistan’s Relations with the Soviet Union’
(1966) 6 Asian Survey 492.
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Liaquat Ali Khanwas invited to visitMoscow, but instead chose to travel to
Washington the year after:
Why this change of plans occurred has never been satisfactorily answered
by the Government of Pakistan . . .However, Pakistan had no intention of
having exclusive relations with the United States. While in the United
States, Liaquat Ali Khan repeatedly stated that Pakistan had much to gain
in the agricultural field through better relations with the Soviet Union.17
At the same time, in a political gesture similar to that made by Indian
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in his address to the United States
House of Representatives in October 1949, Liaquat Ali Khan used the
publicity of his Washington visit to declare Pakistan’s firm resolve ‘to
throw all her weight to help the maintenance of stability in Asia’.18 In
these early days, far from vying for an open alliance with the United
States, each of India and Pakistan sought to establish itself as a regional
force in its own right.
That, however, was not to be. Pakistan, being the largest Muslim state
with a leadership seemingly far more agreeable – in the crude words of
the US Consul-General in Lahore – than the ‘tortuous Hindu who
despises as he grovels before, or politely infuriates by obfuscation the
unclean European’,19 appeared to the Truman administration to be an
excellent candidate for a ‘Northern Tier’ collective defence arrangement
against the Soviet Union and its allies, along with Turkey, Iran and Iraq.
The advent of the Korean War, in June 1950, made such considerations
central to an increasingly aggressive American foreign policy in Asia.
Liaquat Ali Khan’s condemnation of North Korean aggression seemingly
‘decided American sympathy toward accommodating Pakistan’, espe-
cially because Pakistan’s official stance on the conflict between the two
Koreas ‘contrasted sharply with Nehru’s adamant criticism of American
policy in the Far East’.20
In an insightful article, Hamza Alavi, Pakistan’s Marxist sociologist
and activist, claims that, in this crucial period, ‘Pakistan felt isolated, as
17 Chaudhri, ‘Pakistan’s Relations with the Soviet Union’, above n. 16, 493.
18 Robert J. McMahon, ‘United States Cold War Strategy in South Asia: Making a Military
Commitment to Pakistan 1947–1954’ (1988) 75 Journal of American History 812, 821.
19 Doolittle to the Secretary of State, 4 September 1948, United States National Archives
845.00/9–448, box 5959, quoted in Ayesha Jalal, ‘Towards the Baghdad Pact: South Asia
and Middle East Defence in the Cold War, 1947–1955’ (1989) 11 International History
Review 409, 415.
20 George J. Lerski, ‘The Pakistan–American Alliance: A Reevaluation of the Past Decade’
(1968) 8 Asian Survey 400, 401.
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a political orphan on the world stage’.21 He recalls that Liaquat Ali Khan
began his first major speech in the United States with the words that
a country has ‘no eternal friends and no eternal enemies. It has eternal
interests’.22 And the interest that Pakistan’s political and military elites
had long identified as first and foremost was to purchase arms from any
willing foreign power and thus end ‘its extreme military weakness;
a direct consequence of India’s non-compliance with the partition agree-
ments relating to the armed forces’.23 With the Truman administration
finally convinced (much to the dismay of the British) that the US’s self-
proclaimed neutrality with respect to the India–Pakistan tug-of-war had
become untenable, and contrary to America’s own larger Cold War
interests in Asia, a road toward an otherwise-unlikely military alliance
between the United States and Pakistan was opened. Crucially, ‘it was the
US that took the initiative and went to great lengths to manoeuvre
support for it in Pakistan’.24
Apart from Pakistan’s paranoia about its military shortcomings, a key
reason for succumbing to Uncle Sam’s Cold War advances seems to have
been the sheer inadequacy of the country’s ‘international lawfare’, to which
this chapter now turns. In the early days of the global Cold War, interna-
tional law played a particularly important role and was often indistinguish-
able, in method and ideological orientation, from other types of state-led
international political intervention. Pakistan’s inability to compete suc-
cessfully in global ‘cold lawfare’ resulted in deep political frustrations, the
consequences of which would be felt for many decades to come.
III Pakistan’s International Lawyers’ Underwhelming
Coming of Age
‘It is hard to assess the role of Sir Zafrulla Khan’, complains the well-
informed author of a book on Pakistan’s contributions to international
law, ‘because he was perhaps the most laconic judge who ever sat at the
World Court since the end of the Second World War’.25 He goes on to
21 Hamza Alavi, ‘Pakistan–US Military Alliance’ (1998) 33 Economic and Political Weekly
1551, 1552.
22 Ibid. Variations of this statement have been famously uttered by a number of political
realists, including Klemens von Metternich, Viscount Palmerston, Charles de Gaulle
and – perhaps inevitably – Henry Kissinger.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid., 1551.
25 Ijaz Hussain, Issues in Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An International Law Perspective
(Progressive Publishers, 1988) 118.
pakistan ’s cold war(s) and international law 453
explain that during Sir Zafrulla’s ‘fifteen and half years of long stay there,
he did not write more than 20 pages in the shape of individual opinions
or declarations’ and that ‘before his elevation to the World Court he had
neither been a practising jurist of international law nor an academician of
the latter discipline’.26 The author’s account of Sir Zafrulla’s life and
times at the International Court of Justice is, nonetheless, largely positive,
praising the judge’s ‘strictly functional approach to the cases before the
Court’27 in a time of great ideological divisions (between the judicial
proponents of Western, Soviet and Third World approaches to interna-
tional law, respectively). But he could not help admitting that Sir
Zafrulla’s role – or, rather, the lack thereof – in ‘the South-West Africa
case of 1966 rendered him controversial and somewhat tarnished his
image’,28 especially in the eyes of the Third World:
The controversy arose when [Sir Zafrulla] failed to sit on the bench in the
foregoing case with the result that it was decided in favour of South Africa
by the casting vote of President Sir Percy Spender [of Australia] as the
earlier vote resulted in a tie with seven judges in favour and seven against.
In view of Sir Zafrulla’s legal outlook and the fact of his belonging to the
Third World, one can say with hindsight that with his participation in the
case the judgment would have gone against South Africa.29
It later transpired that the Court’s President had asked the Pakistani justice
not to sit on the case because Sir Zafrulla had been nominated as an ad hoc
judge by Ethiopia and Liberia before his having come to the International
Court of Justice. Apparently, Sir Zafrulla chose to comply with this request
‘because his eyes were fixed on the presidency of the World Court’.30
This was not an isolated case. Rather, Sir Zafrulla’s ‘lax and negligent’31
behaviour sums up the unfortunate history of Pakistan’s early engage-
ments with international law. For instance, the country’s contribution to
the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the General Assembly of the United
Nations has been described as ‘meagre’32 at best:
Although Pakistan has a vital interest in the development of the Law of the







32 Mohammed Ahsen Chaudhri, Growth of International Law and Pakistan: A Collection of
Essays (Inter Services Press, 1965) 99.
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in the discussion. Onmany other matters that were examined by the Legal
Committee, such as the establishment of International Criminal Court,
the Rights and Duties of States, and Reservations to Multi-lateral
Conventions, the representative of Pakistan did not say much.33
By way of contrast, it appears that ‘[e]very noted scholar’ of international
law in India and that country’s ‘many senior civil servants’ participated in
and/or ‘wrote extensively’ about the law of the sea negotiations,34 con-
vinced as they were that they could contribute substantially to this area of
law’s ‘evolution and final shape’.35 It has been suggested that one of the
reasons for Pakistan’s markedly less prominent engagements with inter-
national law was its relatively early disillusionment with it.36 If this is
true, one need not look far for examples of Pakistan’s less-than-successful
engagements with the international legal system; virtually every dispute
with its neighbours that Pakistan initially tried to resolve by means of
international law ran into seemingly insuperable difficulties.
Pakistan’s two protracted territorial disputes, with Afghanistan over
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (or ‘Pashtunistan’, as called by the Afghans) and
India over the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, respectively,
left an indelible mark on its international affairs. Afghanistan, for example,
was theonly state to oppose the admissionofPakistan, on30September 1947,
to the United Nations.37 A few months later, on the advice of Lord Louis
Mountbatten, its Governor-General, India took the case of the Pakistani
tribal invasion of Jammu and Kashmir (following the princely state ruler’s
signing an instrument of accession to India) to the United Nations Security
Council.38 Pakistan saw Lord Mountbatten’s involvement in this affair as
deeply biased, given that the ruler of the predominatelyMuslimprincely state
was a Hindu.39 The Pakistani and Indian delegations ‘traded charges against
33 Ibid., 98.
34 B. S. Chimni, ‘International Law Scholarship in Post-Colonial India: Coping with
Dualism’ (2010) 23 Leiden Journal of International Law 23, 37.
35 Ibid., 38.
36 Chaudhri, Growth of International Law and Pakistan, above n. 32, 99.
37 Sultana Afroz, ‘Afghanistan in US–Pakistan Relations, 1947–1960’ (1989) 8 Central Asian
Survey 131, 136. Afghanistan later withdrew its oppositional vote.
38 See Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, ‘The Security Council and the India–Pakistan Wars’ in
Vaughan Lowe et al. (eds.), The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution
of Thought and Practice since 1945 (Oxford University Press, 2008) 324–45, 325.
39 It was this ruler, Maharaja Hari Singh, who sought Lord Mountbatten’s help with the
Pakistani tribal invasion in the first place and who – albeit reluctantly, given his initial
hopes for Jammu and Kashmir’s independence – signed, along with Lord Mountbatten,
the instrument of accession to India. See Paul M. McGarr, ‘Tinker, Tailor, Soldier,
Subversive: India, Pakistan and the Politics of Cold War Intelligence’ in Leslie James
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each other in the Council’40 but all that kerfuffle resulted only in the luke-
warm Resolution 38 calling on both sides in the conflict to ‘immediately
[take] all measures within their power (including public appeals to their
people) calculated to improve the situation’.41 Thus began the two states’
long engagement with the Security Council, which, if anything, ‘resulted in
a diplomatic stalemate between India and Pakistan’.42 Pakistan’s dissatisfac-
tion related particularly to the absence of the call for the conducting of
a United Nations-supervised plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir on whether
to accede to Pakistan or India from later Security Council resolutions – a call
central to early resolutions on the ‘India–Pakistan Question’ that India
eventually managed to exclude due to its subsequent close relationship with
the Soviet Union.43
It is with these early disappointments on the international scene and
a continued stream of ‘cold’ and ‘warm’ conflicts in its borderlands –most
notably the First Kashmir War (22 October 1947–1 January 1949) – that
Pakistan entered the watershed year of 1951. Following the assassination of
Liaquat Ali Khan on 16 October by an Afghan nationalist, the state’s
profound political crisis reached the point of no return. The subsequent
regimes’ decidedly anti-labour and anti-communist domestic outlook ‘was
partly due to [their] authoritarian character, but also due to the Pakistan
Army’s close alliancewith theUS’.44 In the following part, I briefly examine
the effects of this alliance on Pakistan’s external legal and political Cold
War affairs, particularly with regard to the non-aligned Third World.
IV Pakistan Contracts Cold War ‘Pactitis’ but Finds Cure in
China
It was Secretary of State John Foster Dulles – the author of such aggres-
sive US Cold War policies as ‘rollback’ and ‘brinkmanship’45 – who first
and Elisabeth Leake (eds.), Decolonization and the Cold War: Negotiating Independence
(Bloomsbury Academic, 2015) 285–302, 304.
40 Ijaz Hussain, Kashmir Dispute: An International Law Perspective (S. T. Printers, 1998) 11.
41 SC Res 38, UN SCOR, 229th mtg, UN Doc. S/RES/38 (17 January 1948).
42 Roy-Chaudhury, above n. 38, 332.
43 In 1962, the Soviet Union vetoed for the first time a draft Security Council resolution
referring to the plebiscite: see Report of the Trusteeship Council to the Security Council on
the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands covering the Period form 20 July 1961 to
16 July 1962, UN Doc. S/5143 (19 July 1962).
44 Ali, Communism in Pakistan, above n. 4, 16.
45 ‘Rollback’ refers to the strategy to force major policy changes in a target state, usually by
overthrowing its ruling regime. It was designed as the Republican answer to the Democrats’
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embarked on an extensive treaty-making crusade, which saw the United
States form early Cold War alliances with forty-two nation states and
treaty relations with nearly 100 of them,46 a state of affairs which has been
described as ‘pactomania’ or ‘pactitis’.47 Although the Soviet Union did
not shy away from a ‘treaty offensive’ from time to time,48 the sheer scale
of Dulles’ ‘pactitis’ remained unparalleled.
Following the turmoil of Liaquat Ali Khan’s assassination, Pakistan
gradually contracted this disease as well. Even while the prime minister
was still alive, attracted by the prospect of substantial American military
aid, some of his army chiefs began contemplating an alliance with the
United States, most notably General Ayub Khan,49 who went on to stage
Pakistan’s first successful military coup d’état in 1958 and reign over the
country for the next eleven years. Clandestine discussions between the two
countries’military and political representatives finally resulted in a series of
agreements signed in 1954 and 1955, with which Pakistan formally aban-
doned its policy of neutrality and non-involvement in the global ColdWar:
In accordance with . . . Dulles’s ‘Northern Tier Plan’, Pakistan, Turkey
and Iran (Pakistan, under direct US initiative and encouragement) signed
an agreement of mutual cooperation with Turkey on 2 April 1954. The
Turko–Pakistani Pact was followed by the Mutual Defence Assistance
Agreement between the US and Pakistan on 19 May 1954. This . . . placed
Pakistan on a priority list so that ‘special consideration’ would be given to
Pakistan in providing military assistance, including grants . . . Pakistan’s
next steps in the direction of becoming America’s Asian ally were its
membership in the Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in
September 1954 and in the Baghdad Pact, later CENTO (Central Treaty
Organisation), in July 1955. Thus, by 1955, Pakistan was associated with
the US through not one, but four mutual security arrangements.50
‘containment’ approach, which sought to prevent the expansion of an enemy state. Dulles
described his ‘brinkmanship’ policy as ‘[t]he ability to get to the verge without getting into the
war’: James Sheply, ‘How Dulles Averted War’, Life (16 January 1956) 70.
46 Cornelia Navari, Internationalism and the State in the Twentieth Century (Routledge,
2000) 316.
47 See, e.g., Lerski, above n. 20, 402.
48 Described by an unsympathetic commentator as Soviet ‘efforts to enmesh the Western
powers in treaties, agreements, and declarations which impose obligations on them to
their detriment’: George E. Glos, ‘The Theory and Practice of Soviet International Law’
(1982) 16 International Lawyer 279, 294.
49 Ayub Khan, then Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistani Army, arguably began to mull
over a military alliance with the US in August 1951: Fazal Muqueem Khan, The Story of
the Pakistan Army (Oxford University Press, 1963) 159.
50 Afroz, above n. 37, 144–5.
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At the outset of this treaty crusade, Dulles calculated in a private memo to
President Eisenhower that, although ‘we must expect quite a storm from
India if we go ahead with a military program for Pakistan’, the adminis-
tration could ‘ride out the storm without fatal effect on US–Indian
relations’.51 Indeed, although Nehru ‘locked horns with the United
States on a number of nagging bilateral issues in the aftermath of the
Pakistani arms agreement’,52 the intrinsic complexity of Cold War rela-
tions in Asia53 made this particular affair relative to a number of other
regional developments, not least Pakistan’s curious dealings with China.
While suffering from acute ‘pactitis’ with the United States –
a testament to its international lawyers’ inability to wrestle a better deal
and evidence of its military-cum-political chiefs’ incapability to see
beyond the country’s perceived immediate security needs – Pakistan’s
diplomacy had the wit to ‘simultaneously sen[d] positive signals to
Beijing’.54 Back in the first year of the decade, Pakistan was one of the
first sovereign states to recognise the nascent People’s Republic of China
but hardly its proven ally in South Asia. Now, in 1954, Pakistan’s diplo-
matic representative in Beijing brought to his Chinese communist coun-
terparts a surprising message: ‘Pakistan was seeking improved relations
with China’.55 China’s positive response created one of the Cold War’s
most idiosyncratic bilateral relations. That all this happened in 1954 –
the year in which the Communist Party of Pakistan was finally banned
and its many prominent activists either jailed or exiled from the country –
is a testament to the ruthlessness of ColdWar realpolitik everywhere, but
also to the rise of Third-Worldism in its many Asian variants.56
51 Dulles to Eisenhower in an undated memo, most likely written in January 1954, quoted in
McMahon, ‘US Policy toward South Asia and Tibet during the Early Cold War’, above
n. 10, 137.
52 McMahon, ‘US Policy toward South Asia and Tibet during the Early Cold War’, above
n. 10, 138.
53 For an illuminating recent study, see generally Zheng Yangwen, Hong Liu and
Michael Szonyi (eds.), The Cold War in Asia: The Battle for Hearts and Minds (Brill,
2010).
54 Paul J. Smith, ‘The China–Pakistan–United States Strategic Triangle: From Cold War to
the “War on Terrorism”’ (2011) 38 Asian Affairs 197, 200.
55 Ibid.
56 China’s increasing insistence in international relations on being itself seen as a Third
World country and having no interest in becoming a superpower is a case in point and
a direct consequence of its competition with the Soviet Union for the Third World. In
pursuit of this long-term strategy, the Chinese were apparently willing to overlook
internal anti-communist measures put in place by certain Third World countries such
as Pakistan. See generally Jeremy Friedman, Shadow Cold War: The Sino–Soviet
Competition for the Third World (University of North Carolina Press, 2015).
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For all these brave new configurations of power, the Asian–African
Conference in April 1955 in Bandung, Indonesia became the key testing
ground. Pakistan, one of the five Colombo Powers,57 co-sponsored and
took an active part in the Bandung Conference, despite India’s protesta-
tions. Ironically, neither Pakistan nor India were at first enthusiastic
about this gathering. Nehru saw the involvement of SEATO members,
including Pakistan, as highly problematic. Pakistan’s Prime Minister
Mohammad Ali Bogra, for his part, apparently thought ‘[t]he whole
thing was a waste of time’.58 The Conference, nonetheless, proved to be
an excellent opportunity to showcase both Pakistan’s and India’s (some-
what divergent) Third World credentials – especially with respect to
China.
Nehru sought to gain further traction for his (short-lived) rapproche-
ment with China’s Premier Zhou Enlai over the Tibet question, leading to
their 1954 Panchsheel Treaty (from Pali: panch – ‘five’, sheel – ‘virtues’),
at the centre of which were the so-called ‘five principles of peaceful
coexistence’.59 Nehru’s proposal in Bandung was to adopt these princi-
ples as a basis for ThirdWorld cooperation. In response, Mohammad Ali
Bogra suggested that the delegates should consider Pakistan’s ‘seven
pillars of peace’ instead.60 Eventually, the Conference adopted
a statement of ten principles. Bandung turned out to be a setback for
both Nehru’s and Bogra’s international profiles; in their stead, ‘the
Chinese had hogged the limelight’.61 Premier Zhou Enlai ‘displayed
exemplary “reasonableness and peacefulness” and interceded for Nehru
at various critical points’.62 He also publicly acknowledged that
Pakistan’s membership in SEATO ‘was not directed against China, but
57 Burma (later Myanmar), Ceylon (later Sri Lanka), India, Indonesia and Pakistan. A 1954
summit of the Colombo Powers, which proposed holding a large-scale international
gathering of the newly independent states of Asia and Africa, led to the 1955 Bandung
Conference.
58 That is, at least, what one of the secretaries to the Prime Minister intimated to the British
High Commissioner in Pakistan on 6 December 1954, adding that ‘it was a great mistake
to let the Indonesians get away with this idea simply so that the present government of
Indonesia could have an opportunity to aggrandize itself’: Pang Yang Huei, ‘The Four
Faces of Bandung: Detainees, Soldiers, Revolutionaries and Statesmen’ (2009) 39 Journal
of Contemporary Asia 63, 69.
59 By virtue of this treaty, India accepted China’s occupation of Tibet in 1950 and 1951. The
similarity of the treaty’s reference to ‘peaceful coexistence’ with the Soviet international
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was defensive in nature’.63 Bogra responded in kind, declaring that,
unlike the Soviet Union, ‘China is by no means an imperialist nation
and she has no satellites’.64
However, China’s conciliatory role was not meant to last for long.
Sino-Indian relations quickly deteriorated over boundary issues and the
Tibet question, escalating, in 1962, into a full-fledged war. Pakistan, on
the other hand, saw its relations with China flourish to an unprecedented
scale. In 1961, Pakistan voted to admit the People’s Republic of China
into the United Nations and counted as the only US ally consistently
supporting China’s official positions on Tibet and Taiwan. In 1963,
Pakistan and China reached a border agreement on Kashmir, despite
the ongoing territorial dispute between Pakistan and India. At the same
time, Pakistan strongly supported the idea of ‘a second Bandungmeeting’
(planned for Algiers in 1965) and ‘had made it clear that it would try and
use this forum to promote the need for new and binding mechanisms
outside the United Nations system to resolve international disputes’65 –
including, presumably, that in Kashmir. All these developments greatly
disturbed India. Its industrious diplomatic wrangles ensured that there
would be no ‘second Bandung’ and that Pakistan would be reliably absent
from both the initial 1961 Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned States
and their subsequent 1965 Conference in Cairo.66
It was, however, impossible to foil Pakistan’s participation in the
Tricontinental Conference of Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa, Asia
and Latin America, held in Havana in January 1966. It is there that
Pakistan’s alliance with China became most obvious. The two countries
joined efforts to prevent the Soviet delegate (whowas supported by India)
from inserting ‘peaceful coexistence’ into the conference’s general poli-
tical resolution. In addition, the Chinese press was full of praise for the
Pakistani delegate, who joined the chorus of critical remarks about the
United Nations with the following observation:
The United Nations is still being dominated and utilized by the imperialist
powers. It continues to deprive the Chinese people of their legitimate seat
in that organization. Its intervention in Korea, Pakistan, Kashmir and the
63 Smith, above n. 54, 200.
64 Itty Abraham, ‘From Bandung to NAM: Non-Alignment and Indian Foreign Policy,
1947–65’ (2008) 46 Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 195, 205.
65 Ibid., 212.
66 Ibid., 211–14. See also W. M. Dobell, ‘Pakistan’s Relations with the Major Powers and
Some Minor Agreements’ (1964) 37 Pacific Affairs 384, 384 and 389.
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Congo (L) has complicated matters in these places and this is only
beneficial to the imperialists and colonialists.67
Both the Soviet and Indian delegates sought to avoid direct criticism of
the United Nations and fought – ardently but unsuccessfully – to erase
any mention of it in the Conference’s general political resolution. Thus,
the resolution’s final text condemned the United Nations for both ‘having
allowed itself to be used more than once by U.S. imperialism’ and for
‘having deprived the People’s Republic of China of its legitimate seat in
this organization’.68
It would be short-sighted to consider the Sino–Pakistani love affair
solely in light of Pakistan’s perennial disputes with India, or, indeed, the
simultaneous breakdown of both Indian and Soviet relations with China.69
One of the most intriguing aspects of the affair is the United States’
seemingly untroubled stance toward it. For although the US diplomats
stationed in Pakistan had occasionally sent alarming letters toWashington,
underscoring the need ‘to keep Pakistan from becoming dependent upon
or allied with Red China’,70 the United States evidently saw this risky
coalition at least partly beneficial for US Cold War interests, especially its
own near-rapprochement with China. Thus, it was Pakistan that in the late
1960s ‘secretly opened up a communication channel between the United
States and China’,71 which culminated, in 1971, in National Security
Advisor Henry Kissinger’s clandestine diplomatic visit to Beijing.
V Pakistan’s Turning Left, Then Right, Only to Witness the
Soviet Swan Song
The year 1971 also saw the Government of Pakistan’s momentous but
short-lived turn Left, under the leadership of the state’s President
(1971–3) and then Prime Minister (1973–7) Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.
Although far from seeing through the ‘socialist’ reforms he initially
promised,72 Bhutto devised a new approach to his country’s Cold War
67 Xinhua Correspondent (anonymous), ‘Report from Havana: The First Afro-Asian-Latin
American Peoples’ Solidarity Conference’ (1966) 9(4) Peking Review 19, 23.
68 Ibid.
69 On the latter, see Vojtech Mastny, ‘The Soviet Union’s Partnership with India’ (2010) 12
(3) Journal of Cold War Studies 50.
70 US Department of State, ‘Ambassador Eugene M. Locke Lists US Objectives in Pakistan’
(Memorandum, 26 July 1966) quoted in Smith, above n. 54, 202.
71 Ibid., 199.
72 ‘Instead of delivering on his electoral promises of egalitarian democracy and workers’
rights once in power, Bhutto brutally crushed the radicalized labor movement and
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affairs, advocating Third-Worldist ‘bilateralism’ with ‘each of the great
powers’, which sought to identify ‘areas of cooperation with one without
repudiating an alliance with another and thus evolving an internally
consistent and integrated policy’.73 Guided by this new approach,
Pakistan withdrew from SEATO, while also becoming a key member of
the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC, later Organisation of
Islamic Co-operation).When CENTOwas disbanded, following the 1979
Revolution in Iran, Pakistan also formally joined the Non-Aligned
Movement (NAM).
In the sea of changes, China remained Pakistan’s trusted lifeboat. In
June 1976, a few months before his death, Chairman Mao Zedong
promised Bhutto during an intimate meeting in Beijing that China
would help Pakistan build its own atomic bomb.74 Bhutto, ‘long an
unapologetic advocate of a Pakistan bomb’,75 worked tirelessly with his
Chinese counterparts to see this promise delivered. The ensuing Sino–
Pakistani nuclear partnership saw Pakistan develop nuclear capability on
a par with India. At the same time, emboldened by their strategic partner-
ships with China and the Soviet Union, respectively, both Pakistan and
India refused to ‘participate meaningfully’76 in international legal and
diplomatic efforts aimed at curbing nuclear proliferation. Instead, the
nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan became – and still
remains – one of the staples of the two countries’ troubled relations,
bearing as it is all the hallmarks of a ‘cold’ war of their own.
It may be ironic that Pakistan’s only ‘socialist’ president and prime
minister oversaw the country’s full transition into a regional Cold War
power in its own right. However, the irony was lost on the United States,
which saw Pakistan’s new position as increasingly problematic and
dangerous to its own Cold War interests in Asia. Therefore, when
Bhutto was deposed in a military coup d’état in July 1977 and executed,
after a controversial trial, less than two years later, the United States saw
no reason to intercede on his behalf. If anything, it is clear that the coup
leader, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, obtained tacit support from the
instituted labor policies that primarily strengthened the state’s penetration of trade union
politics’: Yunas Samad and Kamran Asdar Ali, ‘Labor in Pakistan’ (2000) 58 International
Labor and Working-Class History 314, 314.
73 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, ‘Bilateralism: New Directions’ (1976) 29 Pakistan Horizon 3, 3.
74 Mastny, above n. 69, 73.
75 Stuart W. Leslie, ‘Atomic Structures: The Architecture of Nuclear Nationalism in India
and Pakistan’ (2015) 31 History and Technology 220, 235.
76 Samina Ahmed, ‘Security Dilemmas of Nuclear-Armed Pakistan’ (2000) 21 Third World
Quarterly 781, 787.
462 part iii : the parochial/plural cold war
US for his ensuing eleven-year long dictatorial rule over Pakistan very
early on.77 Soon after coming to power, Zia introduced a series of
domestic legal and social ‘Islamisation’ reforms78 and strengthened
Pakistan’s cooperation and ideological ties with Muslim states, most
notably the OIC.
That the Carter administration had turned a blind eye to Zia’s decisi-
vely right-wing politics had much, if not all, to do with the emerging US-
Soviet proxy war in Afghanistan.79 Just four days after the Soviets’
misguided and ultimately self-destructive invasion of Afghanistan on
24 December 1979, President Carter telephoned Zia to inform him that
‘he was reviewing ways the United States could help counter the Soviet
threat to Pakistan and assured him of the American government’s
support’.80 That Carter chose to couch the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan in terms of an imminent threat to Pakistan was not insig-
nificant. With the Soviet Union becoming Pakistan’s de facto neighbour
state, the US intelligence actively sought to promote the idea of an
‘Islamic barrier against the Soviets’81 and saw Zia’s Islamic reforms as
fortuitous. General Zia, for his part, regarded the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan as an extraordinary opportunity to gain both domestic and
foreign support.82 Thus, the hitherto clandestine US–Pakistani rappro-
chement entered an overt phase – a phase that, under the Reagan
administration, led to Pakistan’s full military and diplomatic emersion
in the Soviet–Afghan War.
The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, in 1989, constituted, argu-
ably, one of the final episodes of the global Cold War and contributed
significantly to the 1991 disintegration of the Soviet Union.83 However,
both ‘cold’ and ‘warm’wars continued to beset Pakistan. The centrality of
those and earlier conflicts involving Pakistan to global political and legal
77 See generally Omar Noman, ‘Pakistan and General Zia: Era and Legacy’ (1989) 11 Third
World Quarterly 28. It is a dominant – but as yet unproven – view of the Pakistani Left
that the United States was not just a passive bystander to Zia’s 1977 coup d’état.
78 For a critique of these reforms, see Vanja Hamzić, ‘Pakistan’ in Ziba Mir-Hosseini and
Vanja Hamzić, Control and Sexuality: The Revival of Zina Laws in Muslim Contexts
(WLUML, 2010) 154.
79 See, e.g., Farida Shaheed, ‘Contested Identities: Gendered Politics, Gendered Religion in
Pakistan’ (2010) 31 Third World Quarterly 851, 854.
80 Christopher Van Hollen, ‘Leaning on Pakistan’ (1980) 38 Foreign Policy 35, 35.
81 Shaheed, above n. 79, 854.
82 Nasreen Akhtar, ‘Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the Taliban’ (2008) 25(4) International
Journal on World Peace 49, 53.
83 See generally Rafael Reuveny and Aseem Prakash, ‘The Afghanistan War and the
Breakdown of the Soviet Union’ (1999) 25 Review of International Studies 693.
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affairs questions not only the country’s place in past Cold War geogra-
phies; they are a living proof that the global Cold War, despite the Soviet
demise and the emergent ‘post-socialist’ polities in Europe and else-
where, may not have ended at all.
VI Conclusion: Pakistan’s Orwellian Future Past
Except for its affective quality – capturing the frostiness of international
relations bogged down in the perpetual superpower impasse – the ‘Cold
War’, as a term-of-art, makes little sense. If anything, it demonstrates
a perfidious tendency in Western scholarship to describe as ‘stable’ or
even ‘peaceful’84 the period in world history that saw superpower com-
petition and other ostensibly ‘non-violent’ international affairs result in
‘over a hundred wars through the Third World and a body count of over
20million’.85 In this period, Pakistan and India alone fought three ‘warm’
wars with each other and faced numerous military crises short of open
conflict. Moreover, both ‘warm’ and ‘cold’ skirmishes between the two
states continued to occur well after 1989, including, most notably, Indian
nuclear tests inMay 1998 duly reciprocated by Pakistan a couple of weeks
later. To think of the Cold War as a period in which diplomatic, and
indeed legal, efforts centred chiefly on superpower relations short of open
warring means, then, to perpetuate – as Antony Anghie and B. S. Chimni
remind us with respect to international law – an epistemic ‘violence that
thinks of itself as kindness’.86
At the same time, as this chapter has shown, specifically Cold War
relations – both with the two superpowers and a range of other states, not
least its immediate neighbours – have defined much of Pakistan’s post-
partition history. Having ‘dealt with’ the state’s progressive intelligentsia
very early on, Pakistan’s political and military elites gradually succeeded
84 For example, John Lewis Gaddis had the audacity to suggest that this long ‘period of
stability in relations among great powers’ should not be called ‘the Cold War’ but ‘a rare
and fondly remembered “Long Peace”’: John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into
the History of the Cold War (Oxford University Press, 1987) 216, 245.
85 Andrew Hammond, ‘From Rhetoric to Rollback: Introductory Thoughts on Cold War
Writing’ in Andrew Hammond (ed.), Cold War Literature: Writing the Global Conflict
(Routledge, 2006) 1.
86 Antony Anghie and B. S. Chimni, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law and
Individual Responsibility in Internal Conflicts’ (2003) 2 Chinese Journal of International
Law 77, 102. The authors attribute this phrase to Zygmaunt Bauman but use it to
denounce approaches to international law that ‘fail to take into account its violent
origins’.
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in establishing and maintaining the kinds of Cold War relations, such as
military partnerships, that would primarily ensure a domestic political,
class and military status quo. As a result, for most of the Cold War years,
Pakistan was governed by unelected leaders, with two long spells
(1958–71, 1977–88) of direct military rule. Even the country’s democra-
tically elected leaders sought to develop a predominantly inward-looking
foreign policy, such as Zulfikar Ali Bhutto with his quest for Pakistan’s
own atomic bomb. Global and regional Cold War relations helped
Pakistan’s elites not only to maintain their sway over the country’s
internal affairs; they also provided a necessary context in which it could
be said that the country was in a perpetual crisis – a crisis that seemingly
‘warranted’ extraordinary measures, including rule by martial law, on an
almost permanent basis.
It is, then, no surprise that an inward-looking foreign policy has paid
little to no attention to international law, save when it meant a quid pro
quo show of support to a partner state or coalition of states. The early loss
of hope that international law could bring an end to any ‘cold’ or ‘warm’
conflict in Pakistan’s borderlands seems to have spurred the state’s crafty
and reserved dealings with the international legal system, all the while
setting out Pakistani international lawyers and diplomats on a quest to
find an alternative to Cold War international law – be it the NAM or the
OIC or some other multi-state formation. Along this path, Pakistan
gradually acquired a type of Machiavellian international legal and poli-
tical expertise, devoid of any particular ideology in its core (even when
vying for a holier-than-thou position among the Muslim states)87 other
than the constant need for the ruling classes’ self-preservation. This
expertise is arguably still widely employed, by Pakistan and other states,
to produce andmaintain ColdWar-like relations and phenomena (think,
for example, South Asia’s own ‘Checkpoint Charlie’ on theWahga cross-
ing between Pakistan and India)88 even after the demise of the Soviet
Union.
Due to this enduring Cold War legacy, Pakistan often relives its own
Orwellian future past – a constant loop of events and circumstances in
which Cold War-like elites prolong indefinitely a ‘peace that is no peace’
87 On one such early occasion, Egypt’s King Farouk quipped: ‘Don’t you know that Islam
was born on 14 August 1947?’ – the day of Pakistan’s independence: Jalal, ‘Towards the
Baghdad Pact’, above n. 19, 423.
88 This crossing, known asWagah in India, is a home to a daily lowering of the flags military
ceremony, jointly coordinated by the Pakistani and Indian armies since 1959. The
ceremony has since developed into a fast-paced and aggressive dance-like spectacle.
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for the sake of their own survival.89 Simultaneously, be they ‘terrorist
assemblages’90 or some other constellations of predominantly ‘cold’ yet
constant warfare, some of the crises that now befall Pakistan andmuch of
the rest of the world are also a testament to international law’s distinctly
post–Cold War (and perhaps final) evolution into a pure ‘instrument of
power’91 – an Orwellian phase in its own right in which the violence of
international law92 is plain to see.
89 Cf. George Orwell, ‘You and the Atom Bomb’ in George Orwell, The Collected Essays,
Journalism and Letters of George Orwell: Volume VI, In Front of Your Nose, 1945–1950
Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus (eds.) (Secker and Warburg, 1968) 10. It is to this essay that
the origins of the term ‘Cold War’ are often traced, despite it being employed as early as
1938 to describe the Sitzkrieg in Editorial, ‘Hitler’s ColdWar’The Nation (26March 1938)
345–6.
90 To borrow a helpful phrase, denoting a discursive repository of power, from: Jasbir
K. Puar, Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times (Duke University
Press, 2007).
91 M. Sornarajah, ‘Power and Justice: Third World Resistance in International Law’ (2006)
10 Singapore Year Book of International Law 19, 56.
92 See generally Vanja Hamzić, ‘International Law as Violence: Competing Absences of the
Other’ in Dianne Otto (ed.), Queering International Law: Possibilities, Alliances,
Complicities, Risks (Routledge, 2017) 77.
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